That determination typically will not be nearly as difficult as the dissent makes it seem. 1, pp. '"[17], Part III B[14] (joined only by a plurality of the Court) rejected the notion that racial balancing could be a compelling state interest, as to do so "would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. No. of Ed., 402 U. S., at 46; Montgomery County Bd. Swann, supra, at 6; see also Green v. School Bd. of Los Angeles City Unified School Dist., 610 F.2d 661, 662664 (1979), the Ninth Circuit rejected a federal constitutional challenge to a school districts use of mandatory faculty transfers to ensure that each schools faculty makeup would fall within 10% of the districtwide racial composition. See also Grutter, supra, at 326 ([G]overnmental action based on racea group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibitedshould be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). ents in No. In contrast, Seattles website formerly described emphasizing individualism as opposed to a more collective ideology as a form of cultural racism, and currently states that the district has no intention to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as [a] colorblind mentality. Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, pp. It then created a mixed student body by assigning to those schools students who would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools elsewhere. [Footnote 13]. Even supposing it mattered to the constitutional analysis, the race-based student assignment programs before us are not as benign as the dissent believes. Today, they are not. As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. B1, B5. Bustop, addressing in the context of an emergency injunction application a busing plan imposed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, is similarly unavailing. 32, Exh. 3, p.4647 (If this case were to be decided solely on the basis of precedent, this brief could have been much more limited. See Brief for Petitioner at 4647. By 1991, the board had concluded that assigning elementary school students to two or more schools during their elementary school years had proved educationally unsound and, if continued, would undermine Kentuckys newly adopted Education Reform Act. 3, p.1 ([T]he Court is asked to outlaw the fixed policies of the several States which are based on local social conditions well known to the respective legislatures); id., at 9 (For this purpose, Virginia history and present Virginia conditions are important); Tr. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E. 2d 498 (1968). I do not understand why this Courts cases, which rest the significance of a unitary finding in part upon the wisdom and desirability of returning schools to local control, should deprive those local officials of legal permission to use means they once found necessary to combat persisting injustices. At the time, however, Young Elementary was 46.8 percent black. [6] All of the dissenting Justices acknowledged that "the Constitution does not impose a duty to desegregate upon districts" if they have not practiced racial discrimination. Nonetheless, the Seattle Plan, due to its busing, provoked serious opposition within the State. The respondents raised this issue in their brief opposing the grant of certiorari. Id. That view understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion. Can the government force black families to relocate to white neighborhoods in the name if bringing the races together? 32 (2004); A Great Decision, Hindustan Times (New Dehli, May 20, 1954), p.5; USA Takes Positive Step, West African Pilot (Lagos, May 22, 1954), p. 2 (stating that Brown is an acknowledgment that the United States should set an example for all other nations by taking the lead in removing from its national life all signs and traces of racial intolerance, arrogance or discrimination). To Crawford? 2, 2001). Louisville began its integration efforts in earnest when a federal court in 1975 entered a school desegregation order. Id., at 690, 72 P.3d, at 167. [R]acial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination. Adarand, supra, at 241 (opinion of Thomas, J.). 2528. Jefferson County operated under this decree until 2000, when the District Court dissolved the decree after finding that the district had achieved unitary status by eliminating [t]o the greatest extent practicable the vestiges of its prior policy of segregation. However, Roberts considers that this interest is not compelling and that the use of race for this goal is not narrowly tailored, it is instead used for racial balancing, which is unconstitutional. And in light of those challenges, they have asked us not to take from their hands the instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments that they believe are needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and poverty. Does the pluralitys view of the Equal Protection Clause mean that courts must give no weight to such a board determination? Section 5. Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 2021. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237, 249250 (1991); Green v. School Bd.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School District No. 1 Published: June 28, 2007 On June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a split decision on integration in public schools in the consolidated cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. See id., at 2428. The first case started in 1998 when five African American high school students sued JCPS to allow them to attend Central High School, a magnet school. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (CA1 1965); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commn v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 164, 233 A. See also ante, at 17 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) Ibid. Hist. They are based upon numerous sources, which for ease of exposition I have cataloged, along with their corresponding citations, at Appendix B, infra. The Washington Supreme Court issued its decision on the same day the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the seminal cases which addressed the constitutionality of using race in college and law school admissions at the University of Michigan. Extending Grutter to this context would require us to cut that holding loose from its theoretical moorings. 3 Seattle School Dist. The point of the narrow tailoring analysis in which the Grutter Court engaged was to ensure that the use of racial classifications was indeed part of a broader assessment of diversity, and not simply an effort to achieve racial balance, which the Court explained would be patently unconstitutional. Id., at 330. Seattle Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. See Brief for Petitioner at 2526. No. Joshua McDonalds requested transfer was denied because his race was listed as other rather than black, and allowing the transfer would have had an adverse effect on the racial guideline compliance of Young Elementary, the school he sought to leave. To Crawford? See Brief for Respondent at 3132. While I join Justice Breyers eloquent and unanswerable dissent in its entirety, it is appropriate to add these words. As to the dissent, the general conclusions upon which it relies have no principled limit and would result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in areas far afield from schooling. By this term, I mean the school districts interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the districts schools and each individual students public school experience. schools in the last year the racial balancing program operated to the results in the 2004-to-2005 school year (in which student assignments "But the district vigorously defends the constitutionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not resume using race to assign students. in No. As of 2002, almost 2.4 million students, or over 5% of all public school enrollment, attended schools with a white population of less than 1%. No. 1, p.38 (Spring 2002); Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 Am. Initial plans were implemented in Mobile, Alabama and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and in a number of other southern districts in the face of total racial segregation. These and related considerations convinced one Ninth Circuit judge in the Seattle case to apply a standard of constitutionality review that is less than strict, and to conclude that this Courts precedents do not require the contrary. The historical and factual context in which these cases arise is critical. See also Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. And it expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and middle school pupils. Today, they cannot. They resemble other plans, promulgated by hundreds of local school boards, which have attempted a variety of desegregation methods that have evolved over time in light of experience. These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect. And [p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). In over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned. 426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. See id., at 711. The State must seek alternatives to the classification and differential treatment of individuals by race, at least absent some extraordinary showing not present here. As Justice Marshall said, unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Even if the district maintains the current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, Seattle argues, Parents Involved members will only be affected if their children seek to enroll in a Seattle public high school and choose an oversubscribed school that is integration positivetoo speculative a harm to maintain standing. It contains 34 countywide districts with central cities (the 11 Florida districts fit this description, plus Clark County, Nevada and others) and a small number of consolidated districts (New Castle County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky). The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (2005), and overruled the panel decision, affirming the District Courts determination that Seattles plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 11921193. With the racial tiebreaker in 20002001, total enrollment was 36.8 percent Asian-American, 32.2 percent African-American, 5.2 percent Latino, 25.1 percent Caucasian, and 0.7 percent Native-American. 05915, at 4, these ambiguities become all the more problematic in light of the contradictions and confusions that result. History should teach greater humility. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U. S., at 237 ([S]trict scrutiny in this context is [not] strict in theory, but fatal in fact (quoting Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment))). Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. Without the racial tiebreaker, the class would have been 39.6 percent Asian-American, 30.2 percent African-American, 8.3 percent Latino, 1.1 percent Native-American, and 20.8 percent Caucasian. First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in public schools. The dissents permissive strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-basis review) could invite widespread governmental deployment of racial classifications. There is every reason to think that, if the dissents rationale were accepted, Congress, assuming an otherwise proper exercise of its spending authority or commerce power, could mandate either the Seattle or the Jefferson County plans nationwide. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). In the Justice's 77-page written opinion he called the ruling a "radical" step away from established law that would take from communities a critical tool used for many years in the prevention of resegregation. While diversity may lend to a robust education, parents and students have their own opinions on what factors promote the best education possible. For decades now, these school boards have considered and adopted and revised assignment plans that sought to rely less upon race, to emphasize greater student choice, and to improve the conditions of all schools for all students, no matter the color of their skin, no matter where they happen to reside. "[5] He went on to say, "What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification. The plans under reviewwhich are less burdensome, more egalitarian, and more effective than prior planscontinue in that tradition. School authorities concerned that their student bodies racial compositions interfere with offering an equal educational opportunity to all are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion based solely on a systematic, individual typing by race. IV); 34 CFR 280.2, 280.4 (2006) (implementing regulations). in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. Because equal protection on the basis of race is at issue, the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case is strict scrutiny, as both parties agree, and as is well established in the Courts prior case law. 12319 (1965) (President Johnson); Sugrue, Breaking Through: The Troubled Origins of Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in Colorlines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America 31 (Skretny ed. See, e.g., Henderson, Greenberg, Schneider, Uribe, & Verdugo, High Quality Schooling for African American Students, in Beyond Desegregation 166 (M. Shujaa ed. v. Seattle Sch. In order for its plan to be constitutional under strict scrutiny, the School District must show its use of race in the admission process was furthering a compelling government interest (compelling interest) and that the School District plan was the narrowest possible use of race that could achieve this interest (narrowly tailored). In Wygant, a school district justified its race-based teacher-layoff program in part on the theory that minority teachers provided role models for minority students and that a racially diverse faculty would improve the education of all students. Grutter, supra, at 352 (opinion of Thomas, J.) of Oral Arg. See 426 F.3d 1162, 11691171 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). 1617. 05915, at 12, and n.13. The plurality is wrong to do so. No. Provides practical guidance for public school districts stemming from U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I wholly concur in The Chief Justices opinion. The dissent attempts to buttress the integration interest by claiming that it follows a fortiori from the interest this Court recognized as compelling in Grutter. 2006). Grutter at 33637; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 27071. Both districts faced problems that reflected initial periods of severe racial segregation, followed by such remedial efforts as busing, followed by evidence of resegregation, followed by a need to end busing and encourage the return of, e.g., suburban students through increased student choice. However, allegations in complaints cannot substitute for specific findings of prior discriminationeven when those allegations lead to settlements with complaining parties. This the Constitution forbids. Ibid. 05-908, at 38a-39a, 45a. It is an interest in helping our children learn to work and play together with children of different racial backgrounds. These changes conformed with the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy. J.) See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373374 (1886). Roberts, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IIIB and IV, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined.
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and 1, p.5 (The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifications based upon race and color alone);[Footnote 20] see also In Memoriam: Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States, X (1993) (remarks of Judge Motley) (Marshall had a Bible to which he turned during his most depressed moments. According to the dissent, integration involves an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. Post, at 37. We construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice Harlans classical statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 539: Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens). The plurality, by contrast, does not acknowledge that the school districts have identified a compelling interest here. The dissent points to data that indicate that black and white students in desegregated schools are less racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools. Post, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Some schools are more popular than others. In neither city did these prior attempts prove sufficient to achieve the citys integration goals. Other studies reach different conclusions. [Footnote 3]. Justice Breyer speaks of bringing the races together (putting aside the purely black-and-white nature of the plans), as the justification for excluding individuals on the basis of their race. 2d 854 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part [*2761] and concurring in judgment), "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it represented part of an effort to implement the 1978 desegregation order. Reg. When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the board had adopted in 1996. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. With this explanation I concur in the judgment of the Court. . Although much depends on the outcome, the rationale of the Court is equally important in this case and to the future policy of public schools. ); internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Zaslawsky v. Bd. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. [Footnote 12] Each school district argues that educational and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment, and each contends that because the diversity they seek is racial diversitynot the broader diversity at issue in Grutterit makes sense to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone. In light of the foregoing, Justice Breyers appeal to stare decisis rings particularly hollow. Government action dividing people by race is inherently suspect because such classifications promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility, Croson, supra, at 493, reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 657, and endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 603 (OConnor, J., dissenting). In fact, it contends that the District never seriously considered other race-neutral alternatives. In fact, the available data from the Seattle school district appear to undercut the dissents view. Justice Breyer would not only put such extraordinary weight on admitted dicta, but relies on the statement for something it does not remotely say.
PDF The Interdependence of Housing and School Segregation 05915, at 410. Brief for Respondent at 3334. The diversity interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed all factors that may contribute to student body diversity. Id., at 337. 1. Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (2005) (McFarland II). Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a unanimous Court in a case of exceptional importance, wrote: School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. There is nothing technical or theoretical, post, at 30, about our approach to such dicta. These facts and circumstances help explain why in this context, as to means, the law often leaves legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of choice, thereby giving different communities the opportunity to try different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs. Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), cert. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971) (emphasis added). It added magnet programs at two high schools. Brief for Respondent at 3342. See Seattle School District, Ethnic Count 2005-2006, at 8. Id. If todays dissent said it was adhering to the views expressed in the separate opinions in Gratz and Grutter, see Gratz, 539 U. S., at 281 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id., at 291 (Souter, J., dissenting); id., at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutter, supra, at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), that would be understandable, and likely within the traditionto be invoked, in my view, in rare instancesthat permits us to maintain our own positions in the face of stare decisis when fundamental points of doctrine are at stake. The plan created three new middle schools at three school buildings in the predominantly white north end.